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RECENT DECISIONS
ANTITRUST - SECTION 1, SHERMAN ACT - TYING ARRANGEMENTS -
NEWS WIRE SERVICE'S PRACTICE OF REQUIRING SUBSCRIBERS To TAKE AND
PAY FOR FOUR WIRE SERVICES As A PREREQUISITE To RECEIVING ANY ONE
OF THEm Is AN ILLEGAL TYING ARRANGEMENT. - Taft-Ingalls Corporation'
(hereinafter Times-Star), publisher of the Cincinnati Times-Star, contracted
with Associated Press (hereinafter AP), in 1948 to receive AP's basic news wire
service, consisting of three news wires.2 It was AP's established practice to
require member newspapers in metropolitan cities of Ohio to receive and pay
for all three of these wires. In addition, in Cincinnati, AP required Times-Star
to receive and pay for its Kentucky wire. The contract further provided that
Times-Star would give two years' written notice of termination and would, upon
sale or transfer of Times-Star's business, cause its successor to fulfill the terms of
the contract. In 1957, faced with an operating deficit, Times-Star undertook a
stringent cost reduction program and concluded it did not need all of AP's
basic news service. Only the Ohio Big Cities circuit was considered necessary.
Times-Star requested a reduction in the basic wire service package. AP declared
that Times-Star must continue to pay the unit price for all the wires in order
to receive any of them. Because of inability to reduce costs, Times-Star ceased
publication in 1958 and sold the paper to its competitor, The Cincinnati Post,
which did not promise to assume the obligations of the AP contract. Times-Star
did not give the requisite two years' notice of termination to AP, nor did it pay
the two years' assessment. AP sued for damages equal to the assessment under
the contract. Times-Star asserted a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act' as an
affirmative defense and counterclaimed for treble damages. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, gave judg-
ment for AP, holding that Times-Star had failed to prove the existence of a
tying arrangement. In a divided opinion, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court and held: the Ohio Big Cities
wire was a product separate and distinct from the other AP wire services, thus
making the established practice of AP in requiring Times-Star to receive and pay
for the "A" and "D" wires, plus the Kentucky state wire, as a prerequisite to
receiving the desired Ohio Big Cities wire, a tying arrangement in violation of
§ 1 of the Sherman Act and a complete defense to AP's action for breach of
1 Until its sale on July 19, 1958, the Cincinnati Times-Star newspaper was published by
the Cincinnati Times-Star Company. Contemporaneously with the sale of the paper, the name
of appellant was changed to Taft-Ingalls Corporation.
2 A stipulation of facts entered into between the parties describes the basic AP wire services
furnished to Times-Star as follows:
The leased wire news service . . . consisted of general news and stories of general
interest carried and transmitted over the "A" trunk circuit; the financial stories, com-
modity quotations and business news carried and transmitted over the "D" trunk
circuit; and the Ohio regional news and general news copy carried and transmitted
over the Ohio Big Cities Circuit.
Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753, 757 (1965).
3 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §1 (1964): "Every
contract, combination in the form of trusts or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States ... is declared to be illegal ..
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contract. Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 47 (1965).
A "tying arrangement" may be defined as an agreement by a party to sell
one product only on the condition that the buyer also purchase a different (or
tied) product.4 The evil of tying arrangements lies in the fact that they force
a buyer to give up his independent judgment as to whether, or where, to pur-
chase the tied product.5 The development of the law of tie-in contracts may
be viewed as the history of an attempt to prevent interference with freedom of
choice in the market place. As Justice Frankfurter stated, "tying arrangements
serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition."' Such co-
ercive restrictions are diametrically opposed to both the spirit and letter of our
federal antitrust laws which are declarative of an economic policy that unfettered
competition rule the marts of trade. Thus, tying arrangements may be assailed
under § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,7 § 3 of the Clayton Act,' or both, as
illegal restraints of trade; under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,9
as an unfair method of competition; or under § 2 of the Sherman Act,1" as an
attempt to monopolize.
At common law, the few cases dealing with the legality of tying arrange-
ments generally upheld them as acceptable incidents of an individual's freedom
to contract." There were two exceptions to this rule: such agreements could
be successfully challenged where they were used by monopolies affected with a
public interest, 2 or where the monopolies were the result of an illegal horizontal
combination of suppliers.'
Tying arrangements were first struck down as a matter of patent law,
without explicit reliance upon theoretical bases of possible antitrust liability. 4
The Government confers upon the holder of a patent a legal monopoly over a
specified product or process. To the extent that a patentee uses this monopoly
to secure a legitimate reward for his invention or to protect it against infringe-
ment, he is immune from the antitrust laws. 5 A patentee's legal monopoly places
4 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). For general discussions of
tying arrangements and their legal significance, see 6 TOULMIN, ANTITRUST LAWS O1 THE
UNITED STATES §2.6 (Supp. 1965); Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem,
67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determin-
ing Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARv. L. Rav.
913 (1952); Stedman, Tying Arrangements, 22 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 64 (1962-63);
Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HAv. L. REV. 50
(1958); Note, Tying Restrictions: Changing Standards of Legality, 48 CoLum. L. REV. 733
(1948).
5 Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753, 762 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 86
Sup. Ct. 47 (1965).
6 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
7 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §1 (1964).
8 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §14 (1964).
9 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §45(a) (1964).
10 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §2 (1964).
11 United Shoe Mach. Co. v. Burnett, [1909] A.C. 330; Ferris v. American Brewing Co.,
155 Ind. 539, 58 N.E. 701 (1900).
12 Tallassee Oil & Fertilizer Co. v. Holloway, 200 Ala. 492, 76 So. 434 (1917).
13 Cf. Strait v. National Harrow Co., 18 N.Y. Supp. 224, 234 (Sup. Ct. 1891). But cf.
Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Nielson, 77 Neb. 868, 110 N.W. 746 (1906).
14 For a good discussion of tying arrangements and the law of patents, see Note, Patent
Abuses and Antitrust: The Per Se Rule, 64 HARv. L. REV. 626 (1951).
15 NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 262 (1962).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
him in a dominant bargaining position. Patent holders sought to enlarge the
legitimate limits of their patent monopoly by using it as a "lever" with which
to compel purchasers of patented devices to buy unpatented commodities over
which the patentee enjoyed no such monopoly. Such restrictive conditions limited
the freedom of purchasers to obtain unpatented commodities in the competitive
market. 6
Paralleling the early common law view of tying, the courts in the first thirty
years of this century generally viewed patents as conferring broad powers.
Henry v. A. B. Dick Co.' typified the judicial attitude which condoned schemes
conditioning the sale or lease of patented apparatus or processes upon the pur-
chase of unpatented goods. This undesirable extension of government-granted
monopolies was noted with apprehension by Congress. It attempted to overrule
the doctrine of A. B. Dick by enacting § 3 of the Clayton Act.' The A. B. Dick
case was overruled by Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film Co.'" which set
the tone for the modem development of tying arrangement law. The Court,
without relying on the Clayton Act, held as a matter of patent law that any
contract was illegal whereby a seller, enjoying a lawful monopoly over a patented
product, would sell that product only on the condition that the buyer also
purchase some other unpatented product.2"
United Shoe Machine Co. v. United States"' was the first patent tie-in
case under § 3 of the Clayton Act to come before the Supreme Court. The
Court held that a condition United Shoe imposed upon lessees of their machinery
-that certain supplies needed in shoe manufacturing must be purchased ex-
clusively from them-was a tying clause which fell squarely within the pro-
scription of § 3 of the Clayton Act. The Court stressed the dominant position
of United Shoe which controlled more than 95% of the shoe machinery busi-
ness and the concomitant substantial effect on competition.22
The United Shoe case was the harbinger of a series of decisions in which
the Court systematically struck down conditions by which a patentee sought
to extend the scope of his lawful monopoly through tying arrangements.22 In
16 Note, Tying Restrictions: Changing Standards of Legality, 48 COLUm. L. REv. 733, 738
(1948). For a discussion of leverage, see Bowman, supra note 4.
17 224 U.S. 1 (1912). Patentee required that its patented duplicating machine should be
used only with stencil paper and ink supplied by it and successfully sued, as an infringer, one
who used other materials.
18 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §14 (1964):
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to lease or make a
sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other
commodities, whether patented or unpatented . . . on the condition, agreement, or
understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods,
wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or
competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect ... may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
19 243 U.S. 502 (1917). The use of unpatented film was tied to the use of a patented
device for feeding the film into the projector.
20 Id. at 516.
21 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
22 Id. at 455.
23 E.g., B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942) (sale to shoe manufacturers of
special adhesive compounds required for a patented manufacturing process was tied to the sale
of that process); Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., U.S. 488 (1942) (sale of salt was tied
to the lease of patented machines for depositing salt tablets in canned foods); Leitch Mfg. Co.
v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938) (the holder of a process patent may not tie the licensing of
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Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp.,24 Mr. Justice Brandeis held that the
attempt to employ the patent as a device to monopolize unpatented materials
was analogous to the use of patents to restrain commerce, and added in a foot-
note that such use is a "direct violation of the Anti-Trust Acts."25 Similarly, in
dicta in Mercoid Corp. v. Honeywell Co.,2" Mr. Justice Douglas equated the
patent misuse doctrine with an antitrust violation.27
The patent misuse cases culminated in the landmark case of International
Salt Co. v. United States.2" Here, the Supreme Court affirmed an injunction
brought by the Government under both § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the
Clayton Act enjoining International Salt, a lessor of patented salt tablet dis-
pensing machines, from requiring its lessees to use only the lessor's tablets in
the leased machines. The Court held that such a condition was illegal under
both the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Without investigating the market position
of International Salt, the Court ruled that where "[t]he volume of business
affected by these contracts cannot be said to be insignificant or insubstantial,"
such a condition is illegal since "it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose com-
petitors from any substantial market."29 While the Court dealt only with a
patent tying arrangement, the opinion can be read as applying to all such
arrangements. It is submitted that while the Court did not specifically hold
tying arrangements to be illegal per se in International Salt, it held that they
were virtually illegal per se (although these express words were not used) by
including them in a broader category of acts illegal per se, viz, foreclosure of
competition from a substantial market."0 Thus, for all practical purposes, patent
tie-ins were declared illegal per se.
In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,"1 the Supreme Court seized upon
§ 1 of the Sherman Act and the language of International Salt to strike down,
as illegal, leases which contained "preferential routing" clauses whereby the
lessee was required by Northern Pacific to ship all commodities or products from
the land involved over the defendant's railroad if the rates and service equaled
those of other carriers. The Court stated that it made little difference whether
the tying product was patented or not. 2 Though there was no monopoly in-
the patent to the sale of an unpatented material required in the process) ; International Business
Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (lease of business machines on condition
that the lessee purchase tabulating cards used in the machines exclusively from lessor) ; Carbice
Corp. v. American Patents Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931) (sale of dry ice tied to patented insulated
container).
24 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
25 Id. at 33-34.
26 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
27 "The legality of any attempt to bring unpatented goods within the protection of the
patent is measured by the anti-trust laws and not by the patent law." Id. at 684.
28 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
29 Id. at 396.
30 Note 64 HAv. L. REv. 626, 630 (1951).
31 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
32 The defendant attempts to evade the force of International Salt on the ground
that the tying product there was patented while here it is not. But we do not believe
that this distinction has, or should have, any significance. In arriving at its decision
in International Salt the Court placed no reliance on the fact that a patent was in-
volved nor did it give the slightest intimation that the outcome would have been any
different if that had not been the case. If anything, the Court held the challenged
tying arrangements unlawful despite the fact that the tying item was patented, not
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volved, the distinctiveness of the land (the tying product) gave Northern Pacific
leverage with which to force those who desired the land to accept the railroad
as a carrier ( the tied service). The Court then set down what has come to be
known as the Northern Pacific test of per se illegality.
They [tying arrangements] are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever
a party has sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product
to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied product
and a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce is affected.
3 3
With the decision in Noithern Pacific, the law of tie-in contracts took
another leap forward. It had become a virtual certainty that courts would
strike down, as illegal, any arrangement whereby a patented product or process
was tied to an unpatented product or service, regardless of whether the Sherman
or Clayton Act was applied. The early patent cases had played an important
role in molding a strong judicial hostility to any dealing suggestive of being a
tying arrangement. One commentator argues that since a patent proves no
more than distinctiveness, in the interests of consistency of decision between
patent and nonpatent tying cases, there was little reason why anything more
than distinctiveness need be shown in nonpatent cases. 4 This logical extension
was effected in the Northern Pacific case. The strong judicial bias against tying
arrangements which was nurtured in the early patent cases grew to fruition
in the nonpatent Sherman Act cases. Viewed in this historical perspective, the
often complicated nonpatent Sherman Act tying cases and the decision of the
Sixth Circuit in Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp. become more readily
understandable.
Before the Northern Pacific rule may be applied, it must be established
that a tying arrangement in fact exists. 5 Every tie-in requires the linking to-
gether of two or more distinct products. Hence, the separability of products is
an essential element of every tying case. Determining whether there is one
product with component parts or two distinct products is a question of fact.
Since tying products have usually had physical and corporeal existence distinct
from the tied product, the question of separability has rarely perplexed the
courts. However, the alleged tying arrangement in Taft-Ingalls involved news
wires. The Ohio Big Cities news service was the dominant "tying" product
which Times-Star wanted, while not desiring the "tied" products-the "A,"
"D," and Kentucky state wires. The Sixth Circuit was faced with the difficult
task of determining whether the Ohio wire was a product separate and distinct
from the other wires, or whether all four wires constituted but one product,
namely, news.
because of it .... Nor have subsequent cases confined the rule of per se unreasonable-
ness laid down in International Salt to situations involving patents (citing cases). Id.
at 9-10.
33 Id. at 6.
34 Turner, supra note 4, at 57.
35 The common core of the adjudicated unlawful tying arrangements is the forced
purchase of a second distinct commodity with the desired purchase of a dominant
"tying" product, resulting in economic harm to competition in the "tied" market.
Times-Picayune v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953).
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This difficult problem of separability was the issue that split the court in
AP v. Taft-Ingalls. The district court had held that Times-Star had "failed to
provide this Court with sufficient facts upon which it may be concluded that
there is a natural division in the cost of gathering news transmitted over the
A, D, and State trunks. Without such a complete division, it is unnecessary
and futile to explore the other elements of the alleged tying agreement."
3 6 The
majority opinion in the Sixth Circuit, finding this to be "clearly erroneous,"
reversed. Judge O'Sullivan, dissenting, thought that the district court's hold-
ing was "clearly correct."3 "
The district court's "natural division of cost" approach was rejected."
In deciding whether the Ohio wire represented a separate product, the Sixth
Circuit turned to an investigation of the few cases dealing with separability,
cautiously noting that "each of them involved distinguishable facts."
4 AP placed
heavy reliance upon Times-Picayune v. United States
4" where the Supreme
Court held that a requirement by a publishing company that its advertisers take
advertising space in both the company's morning and afternoon newspapers
was not a tying arrangement in violation of the antitrust laws. One of the
reasons for the Court's holding was its difficulty in delineating two distinct
products. This unit advertising arrangement was said to involve two "indis-
tinguishable products," neither of which had market leverage.
42 However, the
Court was very careful to confine its decision to the narrow record before it.
43
In United States v. Loew's Inc.,
4 4 the Supreme Court unanimously held
that the practice employed by distributors of copyrighted motion picture films
of only licensing such films to television stations in a package ("block booking")
violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. From the uniqueness of these films- as
evidenced by their copyright-the Court held "sufficiency of economic power
is presumed," thus effecting a tie-in within the meaning of Northern Pacific.
4"
The Loew's rationale was applied in Taft-Ingalls since AP's asserted property
rights in its news dispatches were comparable to a copyright.
4  AP's news
36 Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp. (S.D. Ohio 1963) (Memorandum Opinion, Civil
No. 4327). Cited in Brief for Appellant, p.llsa (App.).
37 A finding of fact by the district court is binding upon the reviewing court unless "clearly
erroneous." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). The Sixth Circuit, citing Ball v. Paramount Pictures, 169
F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 911 (1950) held it their obligation as an ap-
pellate court to overrule the "clearly erroneous" findings of the district court in an antitrust
case tried without a jury. 340 F.2d 753, 765 (1965).
38 Id. at 772.
39 ". . . the determination of the existence of a tying arrangement which is illegal under
the Sherman Act... is not controlled by the way AP has kept its cost records." Id. at 765.
40 Id. at 760.
41 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
42 Id. at 614. The Court, in Times-Picayune, intimated that the government might have
been successful under §3 of the Clayton Act. The Clayton Act provision dealing with tying
arrangements (supra note 18) had heretofore been limited to tangible goods. At one time the
courts treated tying arrangements involving goods under the Clayton Act differently than tying
arrangements involving services under the Sherman Act. This distinction is no longer applied
under Northern Pac., 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
43 345 U.S. 594, 627-28 (1953).
44 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
45 Id. at 45.
46 340 F.2d 767 (1965).
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dispatches were not only unique, "but they possessed a uniqueness to suggest
comparison with a monopoly by patent." '
The Sixth Circuit then examined United States v. Jerrold Electronics
Corp.,4" where the manufacturer of a community television antenna system re-
fused to sell its equipment unless the customer would also purchase a service
contract which would insure Jerrold supervision over installation and main-
tenance; and further refused to sell any item of equipment separately, but only
as components of a complete system. In holding this practice violated the Sher-
man Act, the Court found four indicia of separability.4" Although these findings
seem to lay down little more than a rule of thumb for a decision upon the pecu-
liar facts before the court in Jerrold rather than any universal norm by which
all future issues of separability might be settled, the Sixth Circuit had little
trouble in transposing them to the facts of Taft-Ingalls to find the news wires
were separable products."0
The case with facts most closely analogous to Taft-Ingalls was American
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theaters, Inc.5"
Here, a tying arrangement was found where an advertiser was required to
sponsor a television program on thirty-five stations which he did not desire in
order to advertise on ninety-five which he did desire. 2 The court once again
laid emphasis on the "uniqueness" of the program involved.
The court made other minor arguments in favor of separability in Taft-
Ingalls.5" However, in the last analysis, it seemed more concerned with the
coercive effect the arrangement in issue had upon Times-Star, rather than any
legal, semantical, or metaphysical inquiry as to whether news constituted one
or several products.54 In his dissent, Judge O'Sullivan castigated the majority's
47 Ibid. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Northern Pac., believed that the test of the major-
ity did not go far enough to be precise and offended the "market dominance" test of Times-
Picayune. He added four other criteria, one of which was "such uniqueness of the tying product
as to suggest comparison with a monopoly by patent." 356 U.S. 19 (1958).
48 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961), rehearing
denied, 365 U.S. 890 (1961).
49 There are several facts presented in this record which tend to show that a com-
munity television antenna system cannot properly be characterized as a single product.
Others who entered the community antenna field offered all of the equipment neces-
sary for a complete system, but none of them sold their gear exclusively as a single
package as did Jerrold. The record also establishes that the number of pieces in each
system varied considerably so that hardly any two versions of the alleged product were
the same. Furthermore, the customer was charged for each item of equipment and
not a lump sum for the total system. Finally, while Jerrold had cable and antennas to
sell which were manufactured by other concerns, it only required that the electronic
equipment in the system be bought from it.
187 F. Supp. 559 (1960).
50 340 F.2d at 764 (1965).
51 221 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
52 The court said, "Thirty-five undesirable stations are not the same as 95 desirable sta-
tions." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 850.
53 E.g., the fact that AP quoted a separate price for the Kentucky wire; the sports wire was
separated from the basic service and a separate charge was made for it; the Ohio Big Cities wire
was operated at different hours from the other services; and the Ohio wire connected different
cities. None of these factors taken in themselves is convincing. Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls
Corp., 340 F.2d 762, 763 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 85 Sup. Ct. 47 (1965).
54 The court said:
... there can be no doubt that the arrangement here involved forced the pub-
lishers of Times-Star to give up their independent judgment as to which of the wire
services was required for its operation. . . . [W]ho better than appellant [Times-Star]
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inquiry into product separability as an awkward approach. He felt that the
intricacies and complexities involved made it "impossible to offer any evidence
for reliably dividing into separate and distinct products or articles the incor-
poreal thing called news."55 He preferred to examine AP's policy from a general
rule of reason analysis. Recognizing that separability is a question of fact to
be determined by the trier of fact, Judge O'Sullivan concluded that the district
court was the proper forum for this decision. He stated:
I am unaware of any case where an appellate court has found clearly
erroneous a finding of fact involving such nuances of meaning and such
delicate appraisal and balancing as were involved in determining whether
each news "wire" represented a "separate and distinct product."56
The Sixth Circuit framed its decision in terms of separability mainly be-
cause this was AP's basic contention. However, what role "separability" had
in influencing the court's final decision that AP's practice constituted a tying
arrangement is questionable. As noted above, the court placed strong emphasis
on the coercive nature of AP's practice in requiring Times-Star to continue its
subscription to three wires which it did not want or need in order to receive
the wire it considered essential to its continued operations. The vice of the
traditional tying arrangement -that a party in a dominant position with
respect to a product is using this as a lever to require the purchase of another,
often undesired product- is present in Taft-Ingalls. Such a practice, viewed
in the light of a strong judicial bias against coercive restrictions and the policy
of our federal antitrust laws in favor of unrestricted competition, is naturally
suspect. Courts have consistently sought to protect buyers against the coerced
sacrifice of alternatives. It is submitted that the adverse effect which AP's
established practice had upon Times-Star, rather than its detailed analysis of
product separability, was the key to the Sixth Circuit's finding of a tying arrange-
ment in Taft-Ingalls.
Given the fact that there is a tying arrangement, the court must next
address itself to the question of its legality. Due to the large number of economic
variables which must be taken into account, the standards for judging the
validity of tying arrangements under the Sherman Act do not admit of any
precise, mechanical definitions.5" Two tests are generally employed to judge
the legality of a tying arrangement under the Sherman Act. The so-called
was in a position to choose which wire services it needed and wanted and to exercise
independent judgment to that end? Yet the record clearly establishes that AP required
appellant to continue to subscribe and pay for three wires which appellant did not
want and need, in order to receive a fourth wire which it considered to be essential,
and thereby forced appellant to give up its independent judgment as to whether to
subscribe to the three unwanted and unneeded services. This is one of the situations
which is "an object of anti-trust concern." 340 F.2d 762 (1965).
This language of the court is found in that section of the opinion devoted to the issue of
separability.
55 Id. at 774. Judge O'Sullivan went on to say:
... it would require excessive subtlety and subjective evaluation to break down into
various components the tangled skein of human events called news so as to be able to
say, as a fact, that information as to certain events ... can be divided so as 1o be
identified as distinct and separate products. Ibid.
56 Id. at 776.
57 Comment, 4 B.C. IND. & CoMm. L. R. 405, 406 (1963).
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"rule of reason" test involves a thorough examination of the entire record for
evidence tending to show an unreasonable restraint upon trade." This is the
approach Judge O'Sullivan suggests in his dissent. The majority preferred to
follow the per se rule set out in Northern Pacific:
* . . there are certain agreements or practices which because of their per-
nicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are con-
clusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elab-
orate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse
for their use."
The per se rule has obvious advantages. It avoids the necessity for a pro-
longed and complicated economic investigation into the history of the entire
industry involved -"an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken."6
As one recent commentator noted:
What emerges as per se violation is a number of specific patterns of con-
duct as to which the courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, have
perhaps pragmatically determined that they will not be led into making
complex economic judgments as to what is or is not a reasonable restraint.
61
The Sixth Circuit reflected this concern that salient issues should not be bogged
down in "a mass of complex and detailed economic data"6 " when it applied the
per se rule of Northern Pacific to the facts of Taft-Ingalls. The two conditions
which had to be met for a tying arrangement to be considered a per se violation
under Northern Pacific were: that the seller have "sufficient economic power
with respect to the tying product"; and that a "not insubstantial" amount of
interstate commerce is affected. 3 The majority had little trouble in applying
this test to the facts of Taft-Ingalls. Sufficient economic power was adduced
from AP's position of dominance in the field of news, the uniqueness of the tying
product, and the desirability of the tied product to the purchaser. It has been
long settled that the activities of AP are interstate commerce.6" Correspondingly,
the arrangement was shown to have an impact upon interstate commerce. The
Sixth Circuit thus found AP's established practice of conditioning the sale of
the Ohio Big Cities wire upon continued subscription to three unwanted services
a tying arrangement in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
The significance of the instant case does not lie in the application of any
new test in the area of tying arrangements. Rather, the decision is significant
58 The concept of tying arrangements was introduced as early as 1911 in the famous Stan-
dard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). "Rule of reason" was the criterion of legality.
This rule was said to be the result of the generality of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, a gener-
ality which required a standard- which was drawn from the common law. The Court said:
• ..it becomes obvious that the criteria to be resorted to in any given case for the purpose of
ascertaining whether violations of the section have been committed, is the rule of reason guided
by the established law. . ." 221 U.S. at 62 (1911).
59 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
60 Ibid. (dictum).
61 Austern, Problems and Prospects in Antitrust Policy-I, in PERSPECTIVES ON ANTITRUST
POLICY 25 (Phillips ed. 1965).
62 Id. at 24.
63 See supra note 33.
64 Associated Press v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
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in its extension of the Northern Pacific test to a heretofore virgin area of enforce-
ment- the newspaper wire service field. It has been intimated that the court's
decision may have been influenced by factors which were not strictly assigned
as grounds of decision. A piecemeal inquiry into product separability which
seeks to label and compartmentalize distinct products proves unconvincing when
we are dealing with an incorporeal product such as news. However, looked at
in its totality, it seems clear that AP, by its practices, has become a danger to
the free competition sought to be protected by the antitrust laws.
Broad issues of public policy underlie the Sixth Circuit's decision in Taft-
Ingalls. One of the phenomena of modern-day living is the concentration of
ownership in the mass communication media.65 As the result of concentration
and merger, little competition remains in the daily newspaper field. In 1953,
the Supreme Court noted in Times-Picayune that:
... despite the vital task that in our society the press performs, the number
of daily newspapers in the United States is at its lowest point since the
century's turn: in 1951, 1,773 daily newspapers served 1,443 American
cities, compared with 2,600 dailies published in 1,207 cities in the year
1909. Moreover, while 598 new dailies braved the field between 1929 and
1950, 373 of these suspended publication during that period-less than
half of the new entrants survived. Concurrently, daily newspaper compe-
tition within individual cities has grown nearly extinct: in 1951, 81% of
all daily newspaper cities had only one daily paper; 11% more had two
or more publications, but a single publisher controlled both or all. In
that year, therefore, only 8% of daily newspaper cities enjoyed the clash
of opinion which competition among publishers of their daily press could
provide. (Emphasis added.) 66
Nor has this trend of newspaper merger and closings declined in the thirteen
years since Times-Picayune. Today, only 55 cities have competing daily news-
papers as compared with 552 such cities in 1923; 95% of our cities have no
newspaper competition at all."
A free press serves a paramount public purpose - "the dissemination of
news from as many different sources, and with as many different facets and
colors as is possible."6  Concentration and monopoly defeat this goal. Only
through less concentrated ownership will the reading public be presented with
diverse ideas expressed in a meaningful fashion. As one commentator put it:
Whether this trend to newspaper monopoly at the local level will have
the serious adverse long-mrun social implications that many foresee cannot
now be determined .... Certainly there would appear to be distinct social
advantage in preserving as many independent, competing newspapers as
are economically viable -and perhaps more.69
65 For a comprehensive study of the newspaper industry and patterns of concentration see
Barber, Newspaper Monopoly in New Orleans: The Lessons for Antitrust Policy, 24 LA. L. Rv.
503 (1964); Comment, Local Monopoly in the Daily Newspaper Industry, 61 YALE L. J. 948
(1952). See generally Cellar, The Concentration of Ownership and the Decline of Competition
in News Media, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 175 (1963).
66 Times-Picayune v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 603 (1953).
67 Cellar, supra note 65, at 181.
68 Learned Hand, J. in United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943).
69 Barber, supra note 65, at 503-04.
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This pattern of concentration of ownership in local newspapers is a legit-
imate matter of antitrust concern. Imaginatively and vigorously implemented,
the federal antitrust laws can play a beneficial role in retarding the general
decline of daily newspaper competition in the major cities of the United States.
70
The result of AP's established practice in the instant case was to force Times-
Star to terminate operations and sell out to its afternoon competitor, The Cin-
cinnati Post. Hence, Cincinnati was left with only one daily newspaper to
promulgate the vox populi. It is submitted that this is an unhealthy situation.
The newspaper ownership concentration problem is serious enough without
adding new causes for its further deterioration.
Viewed against the background of rapidly declining competition in the
daily news business, such a coercive trade practice as that of AP in only selling
its basic news service in a package of four wires became suspect. AP is the
chief source of news for the American press. As shown in Taft-Ingalls:
The newspaper circulation of members of AP at the 43 principal metro-
politan trunk points in the United States comprises 94 per cent of the
total circulation of all newspapers in these areas subscribing to news service
agencies. They comprise 87% of all subscribing newspapers in these areas.
More daily newspapers throughout the nation subscribe to AP than to any
other news service.71
AP's dominance in the field of news is readily seen. Because of its exten-
sive news coverage, few publishers willingly go without AP service, whatever
the cost. 2 However, if the price Times-Star had to pay for continued AP
service was the coerced sacrifice of alternative service from competing wire
services, then AP's service is not competing upon its merits. It is submitted that
there is no reason in law or policy to limit the concept of tying arrangements
to physical products sold in the marketplace. Applying the Northern Pacific
rationale to Taft-Ingalls and denominating the Ohio Big Cities wire as the
tying product, it appears that AP's established practice in and of itself un-
reasonably restrained trade in violation of the Sherman Act. The antitrust
philosophy of maintaining competition by eradicating one of its major impedi-
ments - restrictive arrangements - can be implemented by declining to enforce
a contract which contains such a monopolistic arrangement utilized by a dom-
inant news wire service to foreclose its subscribers from other sources of news,
a prerequisite to diversified reporting. "The real culprit [in this case] is exclu-
sionary conduct; if ended, workable competition will prevail - meaning, pre-
sumably, that most cities will have at least two contesting publishers."7  It
can be argued that this may well be the long-range impact of the instant case.
If, as a result of the Sixth Circuit's holding in Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls
Corp., any future newspaper is saved from selling out to its competitor, thus
70 Id. at 547.
71 Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753, 768 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 86
Sup. Ct. 47 (1965).
72 Comment, 61 YALE L. J. 948, 969 (1952).
73 Barber, supra note 65, at 505.
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silencing that "clash of opinion which competition among publishers of their
daily press could provide,""4 it is submitted that the antitrust laws have served
a significant social purpose.
Stephen R. Lamantia
JURISDICTION - VENUE - § 1401 REQUIREs DIVERSITY ONLY BETWEEN
STOCKHOLDER PLAINTIFF ANm CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND NOT BETWEEN
CORPORATION AND DIRECTORS. - Plaintiffs, citizens of Michigan and New
York, brought a stockholder's derivative suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado on behalf of Front Range Mines, Inc., a Colorado
corporation.' Citizens of Colorado and Louisiana (directors of the corpora-
tion), as well as the corporation were named as defendants. Plaintiffs brought
their suit under § 1401 of the Judicial Code, permitting a stockholder to bring
a derivative suit "in any judicial district where the corporation might have
sued the same defendants." Defendants moved to dismiss, alleging the court
lacked jurisdiction and that venue was improper. Defendants also contended
that Front Range, as the real party in interest, should be aligned as a party
plaintiff, thus defeating jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship. They
further contended that since lack of diversity between the Colorado directors
and the corporation would have been fatal to the hypothetical suit by the cor-
poration contemplated by § 1401,2 venue was improper. The United States
District Court for the District of Colorado, in denying the motion, held: It was
proper to treat the corporation as a defendant, thereby precluding dismissal
for lack of diversity jurisdiction. It further held that § 1401 does not require
diversity of citizenship between the corporation and its directors when both
are aligned as defendants. Dowd v. Front Range Mines, Inc., 242 F. Supp.
591 (D. Colo. 1965).
A stockholder's derivative action is a suit by a stockholder to enforce a
corporate cause of action. The corporation is always an indispensable party,3
and the relief granted is against a third person in favor of the corporation.' It
is frequently argued that since the ultimate interest of the corporation and the
stockholder plaintiffs is similar, the corporation should be realigned as a plain-
tiff. The practical effect of this, in many cases, is to destroy diversity jurisdic-
tion.5 However, it has been settled in federal courts that if a corporation is
under control which can be considered antagonistic to the plaintiffs,' it is per-
74 Times-Picayune v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 603 (1953).
1 Hereinafter referred to as Front Range.
2 § 1401 allows the stockholder the privilege of suing in any district that the corporation
would have used if it had sued the same defendants. This leads first to the hypothetical deter-
ruination of what district could be properly used by the corporation for its own suit if it had
brought one.
3 Davenport v. Dows, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 626 (1873); Greenberg v. Giannini, 140 F.2d
550 (2d Cir. 1944); Philipbar v. Derby, 85 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1936).
4 Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100 (1945).
5 WRIGrT, FEDERAL COURTS § 276 '(1963).
6 Antagonism is present "whenever the management refuses to take action to undo a
business transaction or whenever . . . it so solidly approves it that any demand to rescind
would be futile . . . ." Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 97 (1957).
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missible for the court to grant a "special dispensation" by not realigning the
corporation as a party plaintiff, regardless of its ultimate interest.
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The court, in Dowd, properly aligned Front Range as a defendant for
diversity purposes since "the Board of Directors has not met in recent years
because of the impossibility of obtaining a quorum."8 It was also clear to the
court that the Board "would not if it could do so, authorize the present
action."' As a result, the corporate interests could only be protected by the
stockholders bringing suit on behalf of the corporation.
Section 1391 (a), the general statute fixing venue in diversity cases,
provides: "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of
citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the
judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside."'" Prior to 1936,
this statute also set the proper venue for stockholder's derivative suits. Use
of this statute presented no problems as long as the corporation and the directors
resided in the same state since the stockholder could then sue where all the
plaintiffs or defendants resided. However, if the directors resided in another
state, the plaintiff stockholders could not use federal courts because venue
could not be laid under the general venue statute as to the directors. In the
alternative, if the plaintiff sued in the directors' district, venue would then be
improper as to the corporation which was an indispensable party."'
In 1936, Congress sought to eliminate these problems by providing a
specific statute - § 1401 - for a stockholder's derivative action.' Under this
special statute, "Any civil action by a stockholder on behalf of his corpora-
tion may be prosecuted in any judicial district where the corporation might
have sued the same defendants."" (Emphasis added.) The section gave stock-
holders another chance to obtain proper venue in a derivative action, although
this method was not an exclusive one since the stockholders were still able to
sue in their own district under the general venue statute. 4
In Dowd, the corporation, aligned as a defendant, was domiciled in Colo-
rado while the plaintiffs were citizens of New York and Michigan. The de-
fendant directors resided in Colorado and Louisiana. The main question
presented was: when a stockholder brings a derivative suit in the district of
the corporation's domicile against various corporate directors who reside in
and out of the corporation's district, is double diversity' required by § 1401
so as to defeat venue in that district? Or, is it enough that there is diversity
between the plaintiff stockholder and the defendant directors?
7 Koster v. (American) Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947) ; Venner v.
Great Northern Ry., 209 U.S. 24 (1908); Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579 (1905).
8 Dowd v. Front Range Mines, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 591, 594 (D. Colo. 1965).
9 Ibid.
10 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1964).
11 See note 3, supra.
12 This statute was carried forward, with some changes not here material, as § 1401 of
the Judicial Code. See revisor's note, 28 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964).
13 28 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964).
14 The stockholder also was given the benefit of extraterritorial service upon the corpora-
tion, but only when using § 1401 and not § 1391. See Greenberg v. Giannini, 140 F.2d 550,
552 (2d Cir. 1944).
15 Diversity not only between the stockholder and defendant directors, but also between
the corporation and its directors.
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This section has been given many different interpretations by federal
courts. It is clear that the 1936 amendment deals strictly with venue and does
not enlarge the subject matter jurisdiction of a district court." In Lavin v.
Lavin," the plaintiff stockholders and the corporation were citizens of the same
state, but the defendant directors resided in another. The court held that §
1401 did not dispense with the jurisdictional prerequisite of diversity between
the plaintiff and the defendant corporation, but pointedly refrained from
resolving the question of whether the statute required diversity between the
corporation and its directors.'
One of the first cases construing § 1401 as requiring double diversity was
Sale v. Pittsburgh Steel Co." There, a New York citizen brought a derivative
suit in Pennsylvania against a Pennsylvania corporation and citizens of Ohio
and Pennsylvania. The court held venue was improper as to the Ohio defen-
dants because the corporation could not have sued them in Pennsylvania since
there was no diversity jurisdiction between the corporation and the Pennsyl-
vania defendants.2" Under this interpretation, the plaintiff stockholder can lay
venue under § 1401 only when the corporation, on whose behalf he is acting,
has both venue and jurisdiction to sue in the' district wherein the action is
brought.
In Schoen v. Mountain Producers Corp.,2 on the same facts as those in
the Sale case, the district court held that in the hypothetical corporate suit to
which § 1401 refers, there would have to be diversity of citizenship between
the hypothetical corporate plaintiff and the defendants before such a suit could
even be brought, aside from any question of venue 2 On appeal in the Third
Circuit, the plaintiff contended that § 1401 dealt only with venue, and that
it was wrong to read it as imposing the jurisdictional concept of diversity of
citizenship." While affirming the district court's interpretation of the statute,
the court stated:
In the first place the language of the statute itself is quite clear and
unambiguous. It does not say . . . that a stockholder's derivative suit
may in every case be brought in the district in which the injured corpora-
tion resides. . . . What it does say is that the stockholder may bring his
suit on behalf of the injured corporation in any district in which suit
against the other defendants "might have been brought by such corpora-
tion." Whether a corporation may bring a suit in a given district certain-
ly depends just as much upon whether the district court of that district
would have jurisdiction of the subject matter as upon whether the district
is one in which the venue statute authorizes suit to be brought. . . . It
is true . . . that this construction of the statute imports a jurisdictional
16 Tucker v. National Linen Serv. Corp., 188 F.2d 265 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
828 (1951); Braunstein v. Devine, 136 F. Supp. 156 (D. Mass. 1955); Tucker v. New Or-
leans Laundries, 90 F. Supp. 290 (E.D. La. 1949), aff'd, 188 F.2d 263 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 828 (1951).
17 182 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1950).
18 Ibid.
19 57 F. Supp. 283 (W.D. Pa. 1944).
20 Ibid.
21 170 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1948).
22 Schoen v. Mountain Producers Corp., 76 F. Supp. 554 (D. Del. 1948).
23 Schoen v. Mountain Producers Corp., 170 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1948).
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element into a statute relating to venue but there is nothing to prevent
Congress from drawing a venue statute in such terms and we think that
in this instance it did so.24
It can readily be seen that if diversity of citizenship must exist both be-
tween the corporate defendant and all its directors, and between the plaintiff
stockholder and all the defendants, it will be practically impossible for the
plaintiff stockholder to sue the defendants anywhere in federal courts since
diversity of citizenship will never exist between the corporate defendant and
all other defendants when, as in Dowd, there are defendant directors residing
in the corporation's district.25
The history of § 1401 discloses that it was directed to the problem posed
when the corporation and its directors were residents of different states. Al-
though its immediate goal was thus to remedy this specific situation which did
not raise the issue of double diversity, its policy was the facilitation of stock-
holder's suits by bringing together both the injured corporation and the alleged
wrongdoers in one action." The literal construction given the section in the
Sale and Schoen cases contracted the operation of a provision which was de-
signed to relax venue restrictions. This undesirable construction has been
rejected by most, if not all, of the later cases that have interpreted § 1401."
The first case to apply § 1401 solely as a venue statute by refusing to
impose the requirement of double diversity was Saltzman v. Birrell." While
discussing § 1401 the court said:
The clause under examination presupposes the existence of federal
jurisdiction. Nothing in the statute suggests the need of double diversity.
Such a construction w6uld not execute the policy of the statute which is
designed to facilitate the bringing of stockholders' suits. The words, "may
be brought in any district," have a venue, rather than a jurisdictional
connotation. The language is manifestly concerned with the choice of a
district, a problem which does not arise until a jurisdictional basis already
exists.
2 9
In view of the many problems created by construing the statute as
requiring double diversity when directors reside in and out of the corpora-
tion's district, the better construction interprets § 1401 as pertaining solely to
venue and not as imposing any jurisdictional requirements.3" This construc-
24 Id. at 711.
25 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). See Note, 32 NEB. L. REv.
443 (1952-1953).
26 ". . . this proposed legislation relates solely to venue in that class of stockholders' suits
brought under the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of the Federal courts wherein a stock-
holder of one corporation brings the suit on behalf of the corporation against another corpora-
tion incorporated in another State." H.R. REP. No. 2257, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1936).
27 Glicken v. Bradford, 204 F. Supp. 300 (S.D. N.Y. 1962); Industrial Waxes, Inc. v.
International Rys. of Cent. Amer., 193 F. Supp. 783 '(S.D. N.Y. 1961); Clay v. Thomas, 185
F. Supp. 809 (S.D. N.Y. 1960); Beury v. Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. W.Va. 1954);
Montro Corp. v. Prindle, 105 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. N.Y. 1952); Citrin v. Greater New York
Indus., 79 F. Supp. 692 (S.D. N.Y. 1948); Saltzman v. Birrell, 78 F. Supp. 778 (S.D. N.Y.
1948).
28 78 F. Supp. 778 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
29 Id. at 784.
30 See cases cited note 27, supra.
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tion is supported by Professor Wright31 and by the fact that the statute was
placed in the venue section of the Judiciary Revision Act of 1948.2
The stockholder's problem of finding a suitable forum state, when con-
fronted with a factual situation such as Dowd, is easily solved by applying § 1401
without a double diversity requirement. When the courts construe it as re-
quiring double diversity and deny venue, they are in effect closing the federal
courts to aggrieved stockholders, and allowing the temptation to exist for
directors to mismanage corporate affairs without the threat of a derivative suit.
This construction is not called for by the language of the statute, and policy
considerations militate for the opposite interpretation. The orthodox interpre-
tation by Dowd concerning alignment and venue preserves the effectiveness of
the derivative action as a means for interested stockholders to oversee corporate
affairs.
- Clifford A. Roe, Jr.
31 WRi;HT, FEDERAL COURTS § 73 at 277 (1963).
32 28 U.S.C. ch. 87 (1964).
